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In the last five years, three Arab states in the Gulf have issued Muslim family 
codifications for the first time – the United Arab Emirates (2005), Qatar (2006) and 
most recently Bahrain, where in May 2009 a codified family law was passed for the 
Sunni section of Bahraini society.
1
 These developments leave Saudi Arabia the only 
Arab Gulf state not to have issued such a law. The first codification in the Gulf came 
in Kuwait in 1984, while others have followed the adoption, in 1996, of the „Muscat 
Document‟ by the state members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The Muscat 
document (the “Muscat Document of the GCC Common Law of Personal Status”) 
was adopted “as a reference” for an initial four years, extended for another four years 
in 2000.
2
 It is one of two inter-governmental „model texts‟ produced in the Arab 
region on Muslim personal status law; the earlier was drawn up by the League of Arab 
States (the Draft Unified Arab Law of Personal Status) in the late 1980s.  
 
The three recent Gulf state laws differ in their identification of the residual 
reference to which the judge is directed in the event of a specific subject not being 
covered in the text. The 2005 United Arab Emirates (UAE) law includes a detailed 
provision stressing that “the provisions in this law are taken from and to be interpreted 
according to Islamic jurisprudence and its principles”, with interpretative recourse to 
the jurisprudential school to which any particular provision is sourced, and in the 
event of there being no text, ruling to be made in accordance with the prevailing 
opinion in the four Sunni schools in the following hierarchy: Maliki, Hanbali, Shafi`i 
and Hanafi. The Qatari law offers the first codification to have the dominant opinion 
of the Hanbali school as the residual source, “unless the court decides to apply a 
different opinion for reasons set out in its ruling;” in the absence of Hanbali text, the 
court is directed to “another of the four schools” and failing this to the “general 
principles of the Islamic shari`a.” The Bahraini Sunni law directs the judge to 
prevalent Maliki opinion, thence to the other Sunni schools and then the general 
jurisprudential principles of the shari`a.
3
  
 
Another point of difference lies in the identification of those subject to the 
provisions of the law. Here, a somewhat distinctive feature in two of these laws is the 
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 2 
variation from the idea of a single national code to govern Muslim personal status 
matters. In Bahrain in 2009, after vigorous civil society debates, the government 
submitted a draft for the Sunni section for ratification in the lower house, after the 
latter rejected an earlier draft that included the Shi`i section; the Sunni law retains the 
title “First Part”, in anticipation of a second part to eventually govern rulings in the 
Shi`i departments.  In Qatar, the Law of the Family applies to “all those subject to the 
Hanbali school of law (madhhab)” and provides that along with non-Muslims, 
Muslims adhering to other schools of law may apply their own rules, or may opt for 
application of the state‟s codification. The UAE Personal Status code, on the other 
hand, applies “to all UAE citizens so long as the non-Muslims among them do not 
have special rulings of their sect and community (milla); and to non-citizens in so far 
as one of them does not adhere to the application of his [personal] law.”4 
 
 The codes of Qatar and the UAE are quite lengthy documents, and cover a 
wide range of issues considered to be within the jurisdiction of family law: marriage 
and divorce and issues arising within and after marriage, rules governing children and 
the maintenance of other family members, and the various rules governing disposal of 
property (gift, legacy, succession). The Bahraini Sunni law is shorter and does not 
cover these last issues. The following overview summarises provisions of the three 
laws in a set of different areas concerning marriage and children; it does not include 
the rules on wider family maintenance and disposal of property after death.
5
 Also, I do 
not cover here the detailed rules on the wife‟s rights to dower (customarily split into 
that part which is paid upon marriage and that part which is deferred until the end of 
the marriage through death or divorce) or on the details of the maintenance of the wife 
and children; these are fairly standard elements in codifications across the region. 
 
 
Registration Procedures  
 
All three laws establish the official document of marriage as the standard form 
of proof to establish marriage for the purposes of the courts, with various formulations 
allowing for establishment of a marriage by a ruling of the court in the event that the 
statutory administrative procedures have not been complied with but the marriage 
fulfils the shar`i (broadly, Islamic law) requirements of validity. Thus the UAE and 
Bahrain allow establishment of marriage by “shar`i proof” and Qatar allows 
establishment of marriage “exceptionally [...] in cases in the discretion of the judge”.6  
 
 Furthermore, all three laws include the requirement that couples intending to 
marry submit medical certificates as part of the documentation needed by the official 
charged with registering or notarising the marriage. The tests on which such medical 
certificates are based may cover both physical and mental diseases and disorders and 
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 3 
be regulated by detailed directives under the authority of government health agencies. 
In the UAE, the law requires attestation from the “appropriate committee established 
by the Ministry of Health” that the parties are free of “conditions on the basis of 
which this law allows a petition for judicial divorce” while the Explanatory 
Memorandum refers to genetic disorders, conditions preventing consummation, or 
those that stand to “affect future generations.” In Qatar, the law makes tests for 
inherited conditions mandatory.
7
 In Bahrain, a fine is stipulated for those violating the 
requirements of the 2004 law on medical tests for certain “hereditary and contagious 
diseases.”8 The texts require that the results of one party‟s tests are made known to the 
other. The objective is thus to ensure that one party does not marry in ignorance of a 
particular health condition existing in the other. Less common are texts that address 
what should happen in the event that the test results are potentially problematic; 
Qatar‟s law however states explicitly that the official documenting the marriage “is 
not permitted to refuse to document the contract because of the results of the medical 
test, in the event that the two parties desire to conclude it.”  
 
 
Age of capacity and marriage guardianship 
 
All three Gulf laws under consideration here follow the pattern established in a 
number of other Arab personal status codes in setting an age of full capacity for 
marriage while allowing marriage below this age under certain conditions, including 
the achievement of puberty and the permission of the court as well as the family 
guardian (the closest male relative in an identified order, usually the father). The 
Qatari law thus stipulates actual puberty as a condition for capacity for marriage while 
documentation of marriage below the ages of sixteen for the female and eighteen for 
the male needs the consent of both the guardian and the court, with a stress on the 
need to ascertain consent. The UAE law sets a presumption of puberty at 18 lunar 
years for both parties, at which point a woman may seek the qadi‟s (judge‟s) 
permission to marry in the event that her guardian is refusing permission; marriage is 
however allowed at the attainment of actual puberty with the permission of both judge 
and the guardian. As for the Bahraini Sunni law, the only explicit provision requires a 
female under sixteen to have the court‟s permission (as well as her guardian‟s) as to 
“the appropriateness of the marriage” – which will presumably include achievement 
of puberty.
9
 A 2007 Regulation by the Minister of Justice and Islamic Affairs already 
provided that no marriage contract may be concluded for a female under fifteen or a 
male under eighteen, “unless an urgent necessity exists”.10 
 
All three laws maintain requirements for a male family guardian (wali) in the 
marriage of a female who is of the age of capacity for marriage; two of them 
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 4 
explicitly require that the women‟s contract of marriage is carried out on her behalf by 
her guardian. The Qatari law provides that the guardian undertakes the contract with 
the permission of the bride. A woman who has no guardian is under the guardianship 
of the qadi, while otherwise the law provides that if her closest guardian is absent or is 
obstructing the marriage, she may be married by the qadi if a more distant guardian 
consents, or if several guardians of the same degree disagree among themselves.
11
 
 
The 2005 UAE law justifies its requirement that a woman‟s marriage contract 
is carried out by her guardian on the majority juristic view and in view of the 
„potential hazards‟ of a woman undertaking her own marriage; however, the 
Explanatory Memorandum stresses that the wife‟s consent is necessary and that it is to 
ensure that this consent has been given that the law requires the notary to have the 
wife sign the contract after its conclusion by her guardian.  The UAE is unequivocal 
on the need for the guardian, voiding contracts concluded without the woman‟s wali 
and ordering the separation of the spouses, although establishing the paternity of any 
children from such a marriage to the husband; the “two contracting parties” to the 
marriage contract are “the husband and the wali”.12   
 
 In the Bahraini Sunni law, the agreement of the female‟s wali is a condition 
for the validity of the contract. The law stresses the woman‟s consent and is quick to 
pass guardianship to the qadi in cases where the guardian‟s permission is not 
forthcoming for various reasons. However, the requirement of the recognized wali in 
the marriage of a Bahraini woman is underlined in rather unusual rules addressing the 
establishment in Bahraini courts of a marriage concluded without the involvement of 
the wali. This provision firstly sets a general rule that such a marriage “will be 
considered established by consummation provided the contract is valid under the law 
of the place where it was concluded”; then it adds that if the wife is Bahraini, the 
consent of her guardian is required to establish the contract of marriage.
13
 
 
 Other powers of scrutiny given to the court in the Bahraini law involve issues 
of nationality and age groups and clearly reflect particular interests or concerns of the 
national legislature. Thus the court‟s consent is needed for the documentation of a 
marriage between a man aged over 60 and a woman who is not a citizen of a GCC 
state; and for the marriage of a Bahraini female aged under 20 to a non-Bahraini aged 
over 50 (in both cases, “to ensure realization of benefit and adequacy of 
guarantees”).14  
 
Polygyny 
 
 The three codes demonstrate a cautious approach towards statutory regulation of 
polygyny in ways followed in a number of other states in the region – most notably in 
recent years in Morocco (2004). This is particularly the case with the UAE code, where 
the focus of the only provisions regulating polygyny is the requirement of  „equity‟ or 
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 5 
„just treatment‟ with co-wives, which includes not obliging co-wives to share 
accommodation.
15
 In Qatar, an initial draft which had omitted any regulation of 
polygyny was amended after public consultations and interventions to require the 
notary „to ensure that the wife is aware of the husband‟s financial circumstances if the 
husband‟s situation suggests that financial capacity is not fulfilled‟, although the notary 
is „not permitted to refuse to document the contract if the parties wish to conclude it.‟  
It also requires that „in all cases the wife or wives shall be informed of this marriage 
after it has been documented.‟16  Objections were reportedly made by the Legal 
Committee of the Qatari legislature to this requirement in the draft that that an existing 
wife (or wives) be notified of a husband‟s polygynous marriage after it is documented, 
declaring that it could find no shar`i basis for this requirement, that it was not local 
practice, and that such a requirement “could lead to problems”.17  The requirement 
remained in the law, but the objections resonate with those made elsewhere in the 
region to similar requirements.
18
 The Bahraini law has a limited construction of this 
requirement, whereby a man who is already married must provide the names and 
addresses of his existing wife (or wives) in the statement of his „social status‟  and is 
required to notify his existing wife of his subsequent marriage (by registered letter, 
within 60 days) if that wife has inserted a stipulation in their marriage contract against 
such a marriage.
19
 This seems to place the Bahraini text midway between the UAE and 
Qatari provisions on this particular issue; presumably a wife who has not inserted such 
a stipulation would not be so notified. The Bahraini law also reiterates „classical‟ 
Islamic law entitlements regarding maintenance entitlements and  to a just share of the 
husband‟s night-times in the event of a polygymous marriage.20 
 
  
Spousal relationship 
 
When the laws turn to articulate the nature of the relationship between 
husband and wife, all three laws present lists of rights and duties: one list relates to 
those shared by the spouses, one to the rights of the wife and one to the rights of the 
husband.
21
 Those listed as mutual include lawful sexual relations, cohabitation, 
mutual respect and care for and bringing up of children from the marriage. Qatar and 
Bahrain also include each spouse‟s respect for the other spouse‟s parents and 
relatives. The wife‟s rights due from her husband include maintenance, the protection 
of her property, and the right not to be injured physically or mentally by the husband. 
The husband‟s rights, due from his wife, include his wife‟s „obedience‟ („as is 
customary‟/„in kindness‟, the Bahraini provision adding „in considering him head of 
the family‟) and her stewardship of the marital home and its contents. The Bahraini 
and Qatari laws include that the wife will “preserve her person and his property” 
(Qatar) or in the Bahraini phrasing, “preserve him in her person, his property and his 
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house whether he be present or absent”.22 The Bahraini and UAE laws explicitly rule 
out the forcible implementation of rulings for obedience.
23
  
 
All three laws address the issue of the wife‟s employment outside the home.24 
The Qatari law includes this in a negative provision when dealing with situations 
when the wife is to be held disobedient (nashiz), including “if she goes out to work 
without the approval of her husband”, although adding “so long as the husband is not 
being arbitrary in forbidding her”. In something of a contrast, the UAE law has a 
longer clause on this, regulating the wife‟s right to go out to work without being held 
„disobedient‟, “if she was working when she got married, or if [her husband] 
consented to her work after the marriage, or if she stipulated this in the contract”. 
Unusually, the law instructs the marriage notary to „inquire about‟ the insertion of a 
stipulation into the marriage contract on this matter – although it does subject even the 
implementation of such a stipulation to the „interest of the family‟. The Bahraini law 
has a lengthy article in similar vein. The UAE and Qatari codifications also address 
the wife‟s education; in the UAE law this is included in the list of the wife‟s rights, 
“not being prevented from completing her education”. The Qatari code has a separate 
article on this, requiring the husband to provide his wife the opportunity to complete 
the mandatory stage of her education and to facilitate her pursuit of university 
education “inside the country, in so far as this does not conflict with her family 
duties.” 25  
 
As already noted, the three codifications explicitly allow for stipulations to be 
inserted in the contract of marriage by either spouse,
26
 a facility that is referred to in 
later provisions regarding notably the wife‟s employment outside the home, and in the 
Bahraini law, a subsequent polygynous marriage. In addition, in Bahrain the marriage 
contract document has been amended, according to a speech by the head of delegation 
to the UN CEDAW Committee, to ensure that stipulations could be included at the 
request of the parties.
27
 Scholars and activists in the last decades of the twentieth 
century focussed considerable efforts on the option of the insertion of stipulations in 
the marriage contract, on the basis that the parameters of the marital relationship 
could be negotiated and clarified between the spouses, with the prospect of legal 
remedy in the event of breach.   
 
 Finally, another issue that has been of concern specifically in the Gulf is that 
of misyar marriage. While various women‟s rights activists have advocated the 
inclusion of stipulations as a mechanism through which particular rights can be 
protected for the wife, the institution of misyar marriage rests on mutually agreed 
                                                 
22
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 7 
binding conditions that are regarded by such activists as compromising the rights of 
the wife and more broadly the institution of marriage. Specifically, the wife waives 
her rights to maintenance, accommodation and cohabitation, and generally accepts a 
condition requiring lack of publicity to the marriage, a sort of „strategic secrecy‟ that 
is often aimed at concealing a man‟s polygynous marriage from his existing wife and 
family. The husband „visits‟ his wife by day or night, without setting up home with 
her.  
 
Women‟s rights activists in the Gulf have been vocal in their opposition to the 
apparent spread of this institution and its accommodation in law. In the UAE, it 
appears that their concerns were heeded; the Arab Women‟s Forum reported that the 
2003 draft of the personal status codification originally made specific provision for 
the formal registration of misyar marriages, requiring „limited publicity‟ or 
declaration of the marriage and noting that „full publicity‟ was not essential for 
validity. The limited publicity stood to protect the roles of the wife‟s family, involving 
the knowledge of the guardian (who was to conclude the marriage) and family of the 
woman involved, but not requiring notification of anyone on the husband‟s side – 
meaning that the existing wife would not be made aware through formal procedures 
that her husband had contracted this type of marriage with another woman.
28
 This 
proposal did not survive into the final text of the 2005 law. The Explanatory 
Memorandum declares as void any stipulation that “conflicts with the requirements of 
the contract”; among the examples of such stipulations are included those to the effect 
that the husband stipulates he will not pay maintenance.  
 
 
Divorce 
 
 Across the region, making divorce a wholly judicial procedure remains an aim 
for many women‟s rights activists in the region, with considerable success in this area 
in states in North Africa but little in the Gulf states in the recent laws, which broadly 
retain the husband‟s right of unilateral divorce (talaq) alongside procedures for 
judicial divorce on a set of identified grounds. The UAE codification states that „talaq 
occurs by declaration from the husband and is documented by the judge‟. The Qatari 
and Bahraini laws have the same wording, although adding a requirement for the qadi 
to attempt reconciliation prior to hearing the husband‟s divorce pronouncement. All 
three laws then provide that a talaq pronounced out of court can be established by 
means of acknowledgement or proof. 
29
 Other than this, the codes in Qatar, the UAE 
and Bahrain follow practice elsewhere in Arab states by regulating the effects of talaq 
pronounced by the husband in certain physical and psychological circumstances, 
which mostly go to undermining the presumption of intent on the part of the husband. 
In such circumstances, the statutory laws provide that either no divorce takes effect, or 
a single revocable divorce is effected in place of what dominant Sunni fiqh (with 
some differences among the schools) would have ruled a three-fold and irrevocable 
talaq. The laws disallow talaq postponed to a future date or pronounced as an oath or 
another form of suspended or conditional talaq actually intended to have someone do 
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 8 
or not do something (rather than actually intended to effect a divorce), and take up the 
generally codified position that a talaq accompanied in word or sign by a number 
gives rise only to a single revocable talaq. They also provide that no divorce occurs 
when pronounced under duress, and the Qatari law and Bahraini texts add another 
widely codified position to the effect that no divorce occurs if a man pronounces it 
when intoxicated or overwhelmed by rage. The UAE law differs slightly but 
significantly here, providing that talaq does occur when pronounced by a man who 
has voluntarily lost his power of reason through a forbidden means. The Explanatory 
Memorandum explains this as a “penalty for [the husband‟s] intentional violation of 
the prohibition [on drink].” 30 
 
 As for judicial divorce, based on grounds that must be proven in court, the 
codes follow general patterns in specifying circumstances that are considered to cause 
harm or injury under the existing description of the husband‟s obligations: the wife 
can thus petition for divorce on the specific grounds of the husband‟s failure to pay 
maintenance, his disappearance or his unjustified absence or effective (and sexual) 
desertion of his wife for a specified period, and his being sentenced to a custodial 
term of more than a specified period. Both spouses may petition for divorce on the 
grounds of breach of a stipulation in the marriage contract, and having or later 
developing a chronic mental or physical illness or condition that would (or could) 
cause harm were the marriage to continue, or preventing consummation or sexual 
relations. The UAE law is rare in referring explicitly to „AIDS and similar illnesses‟ 
requiring that the judge divorce a couple where such a condition is established in one 
spouse and there is a fear that it will be passed to the other, or to offspring. The 
wording here implies that the judge is not to attempt to reconcile the couple or 
otherwise seek continuation of the marriage, but is obliged to rule for the divorce. The 
same article deals explicitly with the issue of infertility of either spouse as grounds for 
divorce, allowing a wife or husband aged under forty and without her or his own 
children to seek dissolution in the event that the other spouse, in a marriage that has 
lasted more than five years, has been medically established to be infertile and has 
already undergone possible treatment for the condition.
31
  
 
 At the time of the drafting of the codifications, the debate on the statutory 
regulation of „judicial khul`‟ was ongoing in the region. A common form of divorce is 
consensual khul`, whereby the two parties agree to a talaq by the husband pronounced 
in exchange for certain compensation (often the waiving of remaining financial rights 
– notably the deferred dower) by the wife. The difference in the new statutory 
provisions on judicial khul` lies in the court having the authority, after the various 
attempts at reconciliation, to pronounce talaq for the set compensation without the 
consent of the husband. A few texts already allowed a procedure similar to judicial 
khul` in a marriage before consummation, in provisions that in essence allow a wife to 
withdraw unilaterally from the contract before cohabitation has commenced.
 
This 
provision is taken up in all three of the laws under examination here. 
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The perspective changes substantially however when at issue is a 
consummated marriage where the wife seeks divorce without applying on a specified 
and statutorily recognised ground for her petition. In the UAE, it was reported that 
lawyers working around the draft law had lobbied for the inclusion of a provision for 
judicial khul`, and there appeared to be some confusion over the result.  In the end, the 
2005 text establishes the mutual consent of the spouses to khul` as the norm, with the 
Explanatory Memorandum noting explicitly that “this law has not taken up what 
certain Arab personal status codes have done – such as Egypt and Jordan – in 
considering khul` an individual act from the wife.” Nevertheless, in a final clause in 
the same article, the law does in fact allow the court to rule for khul` for an 
appropriate exchange in the event that the husband is being vexacious in his refusal 
and where there is “fear that they [husband and wife] will not live in the limits of 
God”.  Here, the UAE Explanatory Memorandum stresses that this provision applies 
where there is a fear regarding the conduct of both spouses “if the relationship 
continues despite there being no desire on the part of either spouses for it to 
continue”. The Bahraini law adopts similar wording although disallowing an 
exchange greater than the dower, while by contrast, and despite some reported 
opposition to this provision, the Qatari law stays somewhat closer to the original 
model first legislated in Egypt in 2000.
32
 If the spouses fail to agree on divorce by 
khul`, the court appoints arbitrators to seek to reconcile them for a period of not more 
than six months. If this attempt is unsuccessful “and the wife seeks khul` in exchange 
for her renunciation of all her shar`i financial rights, and returns to him the dower that 
he gave her, the court shall rule for their divorce.” 33 
 
 A final issue in the matter of divorce is compensation for the wife divorced 
injuriously. Statutory protection of compensation for a divorcée divorced unilaterally 
by her husband without „cause‟ from her side was first included in the Syrian 
codification of 1953, and it has become a standard feature of Arab state codifications, 
sometimes termed „ta`wid‟ and sometimes mut`a from the provision in Islamic 
jurisprudential texts of a „gift of consolation‟ for a divorced wife.  Differences among 
the various texts include whether there are maximum of minimum limits on the 
amount of compensation that may be awarded, and how it is to be paid; whether the 
provision applies only to cases of  unilateral talaq by the husband or also applies to 
injury by the husband established in claim for divorce initiated by the wife; and 
whether the text focuses on the husband‟s abuse of his power of divorce, the wife‟s 
subsequent material position, or indeed the husband‟s financial circumstances, and/or 
specifically requires the court to take into consideration the length of the marriage. 
The variable here can make a substantial difference to the wife divorced against her 
will and arbitrarily.  
 
 The UAE and Bahraini Sunni codes are less generous to the divorcée on these 
matters than the Qatari. Both limit the maximum amount of any award to the sum of 
one year‟s maintenance. In the UAE, the provision appears to constrain the 
entitlement to cases of talaq only, and subjects the entitlement to the circumstances of 
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the husband, while requiring the „prejudice suffered by the woman‟ to be taken into 
account in the assessment. Bahrain adds the length of the marriage and the 
circumstances of the talaq as factors to be taken into account along with the financial 
situation of the divorcer. The Qatari code however allows an entitlement to mut`a to 
every woman divorced by reason from the husband, with the exception of divorce for 
lack of maintenance by reason of the husband‟s poverty, and sets an upper limit of 
three years‟ maintenance. 34  
 
Child custody 
 
The Gulf laws follow the approach of dividing the functions of parenting into 
those of custodian and guardian, and identifying the former with the mother and the 
latter with the father, in the first instance. In this description of the relationship, the 
custodian has duties of physical care and bringing up of minor children, while the 
guardian has duties and authorities in regard to their financial affairs, their education, 
travel and other areas where the ward meets the „public‟ world outside the home, as 
well as being financially responsible for them. The distinct duties of mother 
(custodian) and father (guardian) reflect gendered assumptions of „ideal-type‟ social 
and familial roles in the upbringing of children, during marriage as well as after 
divorce, although as already noted, the duty of caring for children and providing them 
with a „sound upbringing‟ is duty shared by husband and wife in the Qatari and 
Bahraini laws. The UAE law reflects these assumptions in its description of custody 
as “caring for the child and bringing him [/her] up and looking after him [/her] to the 
extent that this does not conflict with the guardian‟s right in guardianship over the 
person [of the ward]”. The Qatari law, after a similar description of the function of 
custody, adds, significantly, that “custody is a right shared between the custodian and 
the minor, and the minor‟s right is the stronger.”35 
  
Developments in personal status laws in the region have tended generally to 
extend the period of custody normally assigned to a woman over her children 
following divorce beyond the age limits contemplated in the majority of the fiqh rules. 
In addition, they have increasingly included statutory references to the concept of the 
„interest of the child‟ on which the judge may modify this and other related parts of 
the law, including primary allocation of custody rights. The three new Gulf laws are 
part of more recent patterns in this direction. In the draft UAE codification approved 
by cabinet in 2005, a provision ending the mother‟s custody over girls at thirteen and 
boys at eleven provoked public condemnation by lawyers who had consulted on 
previous drafts and held these ages to be a curtailment of existing custody rights. The 
intervention appears to have had some impact: while the text of the law as passed 
maintained this position, it allows the court to extend a woman‟s custody until the 
male ward reaches puberty and the female marries. The UAE law allows the set 
extensions beyond these ages to made by the court in consideration of the ward‟s 
interest. The Qatari law provides for a woman‟s custody to end in the case of male 
children at thirteen and females at fifteen, while allowing extension (in the ward‟s 
interest) to fifteen for males and until a female‟s consummation of her marriage. The 
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Bahraini law sets women‟s custody to end at fifteen for the male ward and for the 
female at seventeen or consummation of marriage, with wards who have reached 
those ages – and in the female‟s case have not married – allowed to choose to be 
under the care (damm) of either parent or another person with the right of custody. 
The UAE and the Qatari codes also provide that the woman‟s custody continues 
indefinitely if the ward is mentally or physically disabled, again subject to the best 
interest of the child. 
36
 
 
The court‟s consideration of the interest of the child is also increasingly 
required in codifications across the region in assessing the otherwise normative 
assignment of the function – or right – of custody to an identified succession of 
relatives. The Qatari law is unusual in setting out what qualities the qadi is to consider 
in making such an assessment of the interest of the child. These include the 
custodian‟s affection for the child and ability to raise him or her, the provision of a 
sound environment in which the child can be brought up and „protected from 
delinquency‟, the ability to provide the best education and medical care, and the 
ability to prepare the child in terms of morals and customs for the time that he or she 
is ready to „leave the custody of women‟.37 
 
The three laws follow earlier Arab state codifications in requiring that in the 
event that custody is assigned to a man, he must have “a woman with him who can 
undertake the functions of custody”.  However, the UAE and Qatari laws are also part 
of a quite recent trend of establishing the father as following the mother in the 
presumptive order of entitled custodians, before the maternal (or in the Qatari case 
paternal) grandmother and other female relatives. The UAE law explicitly provides 
that the succession of relatives to custody is followed “unless the judge decides 
otherwise in the interest of the child”; the Qatari code is more constrained here, 
allowing the interest of the child to be considered in the case that a closer relative 
waives the right of custody (giving reasons for this) in favour of a more distant 
custodian. However, as noted above, the Qatari treatment of custody already 
establishes that the interest of the child is paramount: even in regard to the parents it 
notes that even if the parents have separated and not divorced, the mother is first 
entitled to custody of a minor child, unless the qadi decides differently in the interest 
of the child. Apart from this, both these codes take a detailed „listing‟ approach, with 
some seventeen individuals or categories of relatives successively entitled to claim 
custody of a minor child under the UAE law, and eighteen under the Qatari law. The 
Bahraini law normatively assigns custody to the mother followed by maternal and 
paternal grandmothers and ascendants, only then followed by the father and other 
relatives. It specifically allows the court to “seek assistance from experts in 
psychology and sociology in determining [assignment of] custody, taking into account 
the best interest of the child”.38 
 
On another contested issue, all three legislatures address the general rule that a 
mother loses her right to custody if she remarries a man who is not a close relative of 
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the ward. The specific issue of remarriage remains an advocacy target in different 
countries, inter alia on the grounds of discrimination (the father not being subject to 
such restrictions) and on the choice it imposes on women, whose ability to remarry 
may be constrained by the threat of losing custody of their children, as well as on the 
grounds of the rights and best interest of the child. The three laws explicitly allow the 
judge to consider the interest of the child in allowing custody to remain with the 
mother (or other female custodian) in the event that she has consummated a new 
marriage with a man who is not a close relative of the ward.
39
  
 
 Finally, another regional pattern of codifications with which the three Gulf 
laws under consideration here have tended to remain consistent is the different rules 
applying to the non-Muslim custodian of the children of Muslim fathers. Here, the 
texts tend to set shorter periods of custody – particularly if the custodian is not the 
mother – or not to allow the extension of the statutory period, sometimes subjecting 
this to the best interest of the child; they may explicitly allow for custody to be 
terminated if it is established that she is bringing the child up to believe in a different 
faith. Thus the UAE law stipulates that a mother of a different religion loses custody 
of her child unless the qadi decides otherwise in the interest of the child, and in all 
cases that her custody ends when the child is five years old. The Qatari law allows a 
non-Muslim mother to have custody until the child is seven, provided she is not an 
apostate from Islam, and unless there is fear that the ward is acquiring a different 
religion. The Bahraini law does not address this explicitly, but unusually includes 
„Islam‟ as a quality that is stipulated in the custodian along with other more standard 
qualities such as sanity and majority; if this were applied to deny a non-Muslim 
mother custody of her minor Muslim children, it would be a restriction unfamiliar 
both in the regional codes and in contemporary Sunni jurisprudence. Specific 
consideration is again given to the issue of citizenship, with the law providing 
residency rights during the period of custody for the (non-Bahraini) custodian of a 
Bahraini ward.
40
 
 
 
Paternity/Maternity 
 
The Gulf state laws follow established patterns in the region in the rules 
governing paternity and the legal affiliation (nasab) of a child to her or his father (and 
thus the establishment of the child‟s paternal lineage) and those governing adoption. 
Established jurisprudence (fiqh) principles assume that „the child is [affiliated] to the 
conjugal bed‟ and award legitimate filiation to the husband of the woman who has 
given birth to the child, unless it is otherwise claimed by the husband and proven 
through the traditional process of li`an, where the man denies on oath that the child is 
his and the woman denies his allegation and the process results in a final divorce 
between the couple with paternity not established. The three laws codify rules on 
li`an; the UAE law in a final clause allows the court to “seek the assistance of 
scientific methods for refutation of nasab provided that it has not been previously 
established”, although the Explanatory Memorandum subjects this procedure to the 
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previous clauses of the paragraph describing the li`an procedure.  The Bahraini Sunni 
law requires DNA tests to be carried out on all parties before the process of li`an, and 
disallows the refutation of nasab by li`an in the event that paternity is established.
41
  
 
The Gulf codes under consideration here follow – as do other Arab 
codifications – established fiqh rules in requiring that to have a „legitimate‟ nasab, the 
child must be not only born but also conceived in the framework of marriage or of 
what the couple believed to be a marriage. The jurists thus looked to minimum and 
maximum periods of gestation to uphold or undermine the presumption of legitimacy 
of children born to a married couple. While there was generally consensus on the 
minimum period of gestation at six months, the jurists differed as to the maximum. 
Failing the presumption of paternity through a known marriage, paternity and nasab 
(and indeed maternity for a child of unknown parentage) can also be established by 
acknowledgement, providing certain conditions of feasibility are met, and „shar`i 
evidence‟. 
 
All three new Gulf codifications establish one year as the maximum period of 
gestation and six months as the minimum as a substantive rule, although the UAE 
adds “unless a medical committee established for this purpose decides otherwise.” 
The key issue here is the difference made in the laws between a father‟s paternity and 
a child‟s „lineage‟ (nasab). If paternity is a biological fact, „lineage‟ denotes the 
legally established filiation of the child to the parents and the subsequent 
establishment of legal rights and claims. In the case of the mother, nasab is 
established by the fact of her giving birth to the child. For the father, on the other 
hand, in the event of the putative father‟s denial, the laws generally require proof of 
an established shar`i relationship (that is, legitimate under the rulings of Islamic 
jurisprudence) between the parents; and as the Explanatory Memorandum to the UAE 
law notes (p.200) „this is the fundamental [relationship] because the child follows his 
[/her] father in nasab‟. The UAE, Qatari and Bahraini Sunni laws follow the dominant 
pattern in that biological paternity alone does not give rise to the father‟s legal and 
financial responsibilities towards his child; biological maternity, on the other hand, 
gives rise to a mother‟s duties to her child whether the child was born in or out of a 
recognised marital relationship. This brings in the matter of statutory rules for the 
recognition of marriages. In general, the establishment of paternity and nasab is an 
exception to rules that might otherwise exclude state recognition of rights and claims 
arising from a marriage not conforming with the procedures legislated as mandatory 
by the state. In an undocumented and unregistered marriage, for example, the couple 
may decide to regularise their status in regard to the central authorities when the time 
comes to register children from the marriage; the principle generally holds that 
establishing lineage works to establish the marriage, rather than having to establish 
the formalities of the marriage in order to establish lineage. However, serious 
problems arise when one party, usually the man, denies the existence of the marriage, 
and the other is unable to prove it to the satisfaction of the state. The Bahraini law 
includes a provision explicitly regarding circumstances in which the parties have 
become „engaged‟ with the knowledge of their families and agreement of the wife‟s 
guardian but the marriage has not been documented and the woman becomes 
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pregnant; if the husband denies he is the father, “all lawful (shar`i) means may be 
resorted to in order to establish lineage.” This wording is similar to that used in the 
2004 Moroccan law as a result of advocacy from women‟s and child‟s rights activists, 
and has been used there to empower the court to impose DNA testing on a man in 
certain circumstances of disputed paternity.
42
    
 
The UAE wording on how nasab is to be established to the father adds, after 
the conjugal bed, acknowledgement, and [shar`i] evidence, that this can be done 
“through scientific methods where the conjugal bed is established.” The Explanatory 
Memorandum, quoted below, sets out the relationship between the envisaged use of 
methods such as DNA testing and the jurisprudential rules on “the existence of the 
conjugal bed.” In the arguments for the need to establish nasab (rather than biological 
paternity), references are made not only to the range of rights and responsibilities that 
arise to individuals through filiation but also to the wider societal context: 
 
This article refers to establishing paternity through modern scientific 
methods such as DNA testing, which are scientific means of establishing 
the definite relationship between the child and his [/her] father; but in 
order not to make a mockery of the issues involved in establishment of 
paternity, by making it a matter simply of establishing this relationship 
through a medical test, the article has linked its ruling to the existence of 
the conjugal bed in accordance with article 90. This is to prevent what has 
happened in a number of cases, with sperm being taken from a man and 
implanted into a woman without there being any shar`i tie between them. 
Then medical tests establish the paternal relationship, while it is not 
possible for the child to be attributed to the father in terms of lineage 
(nasab) in such circumstances.  These means have developed in our time, 
and now there are laboratories and sperm banks.[…] If we were to allow 
nasab to be established in such cases, it would be problematic in regard 
for example to inheritance, and the impediment of affinity. And the 
woman might be married to another man, so lineage is mixed and 
corruption appears...(pp.200-1) 
 
Here, the need to properly assign lineage is linked to the entitlements of those related 
by nasab to proportions of each other‟s estate under the law of succession, and to the 
rules prohibiting marriage between a range of persons related through nasab and 
through marriage. The concerns raised at the prospect of „mixing lineage‟ move from 
the more traditional requirement of a „conjugal bed‟ and lawful sexual relations to 
reproductive technologies in so far as the latter involve sperm (or eggs) provided by 
third parties. 
 
 Similar preoccupations with the „mixing of lineage‟ – as well as the 
established fiqh position - can be seen to underlie the general approaches to adoption 
in Arab states. This issue is not dealt with in the UAE or Qatari codes, while the 
Bahraini law clarifies that adoption may not give rise to the establishment of paternity 
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or its shar`i effects.
43
 Elsewhere, some Arab codifications explicitly prohibit adoption, 
while the Algerian family law of 1984 is unusual in including a separate section on 
the Islamic institution of kafala. Broadly speaking, kafala is a system of care that 
allows a child to be looked after and brought up in a family not his or her own, with 
similar rights of maintenance, education and so on that pertain to minors but without 
key attributes of nasab (family name, fractional inheritance entitlements). The 
institution of kafala is explicitly referred to in the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC), in the same article as fostering placement and adoption, regarding the 
care of a child “temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family 
environment”. The UAE entered an explicit reservation to this article, stating that the 
UAE does not permit this system (adoption) “given its commitment to the principles 
of Islamic law.” In the case of Qatar, prior to the announcement of a “partial 
withdrawal” of its general reservation to the CRC in 2009, Qatar had already clarified 
in its initial report to the CRC‟s monitoring body that it did not recognise adoption as 
a system.
44
 Bahrain entered no reservations to the CRC but clarified in its first report 
in 2001 that while it does not apply the system of adoption as understood in the CRC, 
Bahrain‟s then Cabinet had approved “the Fosterage Act” (a law on kafala) to regulate 
this system of care.
45
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